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Executive Summary
Based on interviews with pension scheme CEOs, senior trustees, senior policy 
advisers, actuaries and industry association leaders, our research applies 
Black Box Thinking to the UK defined benefit pensions sector and finds strong 
evidence that many schemes have a closed loop mindset towards failure.
The Black Box Thinking framework, developed by Matthew Syed, can be 
used to analyse which industry sectors have an open loop1 mindset towards 
failure which leads in time to low failure rates – a classic example being 
civil aviation. By contrast, sectors with closed loop2 thinking tend to be 
characterised by high error rates – as the healthcare sector demonstrates.
The UK pension industry is more like the healthcare industry than the civil aviation 
sector. Although some DB schemes follow many of the best practices outlined 
in Black Box Thinking, by systematically attempting to identify and evaluate 
mistakes, interviewees report a wide divergence in the ability of boards to learn 
from past mistakes – because it depends so much on a particular scheme’s good 
fortune in forming the right constellation of board members and advisers. 
Less fortunate schemes exhibit the typical behaviour of a closed loop mindset, 
including not setting strong measurable targets, inertia in decision making, 
herding behaviour, shifting goal posts, failing to take ownership of mistakes 
and blaming others. Such schemes do not enjoy Black Box Thinking’s virtuous 
cycle whereby errors are reported and measured, the scheme’s culture allows 
introspection about mistakes, feedback loops are applied and processes to 
combat human biases are established – leading over time to better outcomes 
involving fewer errors.
We find that by adopting Black Box Thinking, the strategic decision making 
by boards of trustees in the UK’s DB sector could be markedly improved. 
There are many actions that individual boards can take for themselves 
from the bottom-up. These include the regular appointment of new board 
members and advisers, improving diversity, sympathetic advisers sharing 
best practice, conferences and forums, away days, administrative pooling 
arrangements and consolidation.
But Black Box Thinking analysis of civil aviation also finds that it is necessary 
to have a central clearing house where actors can learn about the failings of 
others and this is something that the DB sector lacks. The Pensions Regulator 
could take up this top-down role by performing post-mortems of failed 
schemes and making these available to all schemes.
The Black Box Thinking framework could help solve the dilemma of the UK 
pensions industry encapsulated neatly by the CEO of one scheme who said 
“Well if I were you, I wouldn’t start from here”, pointing out that the best 
opportunity we had for building a better DB system, perhaps along the lines 
1  An open loop is where “a strategy is put into action, then tested to see if it is working. 
By seeing what is going wrong, you can then improve the strategy” (pp. 193-4).
2  A closed loop is where “failure does not lead to progress, because information on errors 
and weaknesses is misinterpreted or ignored” (p. 15).
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of the Dutch collective defined contribution system, was probably 20 or 30 
years ago before the barriers to radical change were raised so high.
Both Black Box Thinking and the experts we interviewed suggest that trustees 
do still have the power to make substantial improvements to the system, scheme-
by-scheme from the bottom-up. It is a matter of improved board governance 
and appointing a group of trustees with the capability, expertise, resources and 
time to look at issues from a different perspective. Boards need to spend more 
time on strategic thinking and move away from the practice of lurching from 
one short-term problem to another. This approach of helping boards to improve 
organically is a markedly different approach from the regulatory-driven top-
down approaches of the past. So this is the place we should start from.
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Introduction
Is there a crisis in the defined benefit (DB) occupational pensions system? Are 
schemes under stress? The debate has intensified since the high profile failure of 
BHS.3 The trustees and regulators of the UK’s 6,000 remaining DB schemes face 
huge uncertainties concerning asset returns, interest rates, inflation, life expectancy 
and the strength of the sponsor covenant. 
But what if there’s a way to reframe the debate in a way that anticipates rather 
than reacts to problems? Instead of looking for top-down collective solutions 
imposed by regulators – a necessarily slow and imperfect process – why not seek 
to improve the performance of schemes individually and change the system more 
rapidly from the bottom-up?
For the trustees of DB occupational pensions, Black Box Thinking: The Surprising 
Truth about Success could be an idea whose time has come. The framework 
developed in Matthew Syed’s book is designed to help the people in organisations 
and systems to produce better outcomes by learning from failures.4 Regardless of 
one’s view of the DB sector, it’s hard to disagree with the framework’s idea that DB 
schemes should admit their errors and to seek to learn from them.
Black Box Thinking contrasts the commercial aviation industry where around 300 
people die per year in the US and the healthcare sector where medical errors 
cause 120,000 US deaths annually. Doctors and nurses are driven individuals 
committed to saving people’s lives. Airline directors are business oriented, focused 
on cutting costs, systematically overbook flights and knowingly leave passengers 
behind. Yet there are few deaths in aviation accidents and many from medical 
errors. The book finds this is due to major differences in how aviation and 
healthcare approach failure.
The key message from the aviation industry is to learn from the series of events 
leading up to a specific accident and broadly share these lessons throughout the 
sector, making it possible to identify similar patterns that can be addressed to 
avoid accidents in the future. Black Box Thinking5 endorses the findings of Nobel 
laureate Daniel Kahneman that, as individuals, we find it difficult to deal with 
our human cognitive biases, but, as organisations, we can create structures that 
mitigate them. With its positive “open loop” mindset towards identifying and acting 
on failure, the aviation industry is a good example of applying this in practice. 
The mindset towards failure in the health care sector is remarkably different. It is a 
decentralised industry where the experts – the doctors – must make instantaneous 
judgement calls when attending to patients who are in a critical condition. But the 
sector is not set up to encourage doctors to admit their contribution to the events 
3  BHS, the high street chain formerly owned by Sir Philip Green, became insolvent in April 2016 
with the loss of 11,000 jobs and the risk that 19,000 members of the BHS pension scheme 
would end up in the Pension Protection Fund and lose up to 10% of their pension entitlements. 
Following intense pressure from the parliamentary Work and Pensions Select Committee 
chaired by Frank Field, Green was forced to bail out the scheme with a £363m payment in 
February 2017.
4  We use the terms “mistake”, “failure”, and “error” interchangeably as synonyms throughout the 
report.
5  The term “black box” comes from the flight recorder that is so critical in identifying why planes 
crash.
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that lead to mistakes nor to share them across their decentralised network, making 
it more difficult to identify patterns and prevent future errors. Black Box Thinking 
describes this as a “closed loop” mindset.
Do the unique features of the DB sector pose a challenge for Black Box Thinking? 
Many papers have been written about the issues facing UK DB schemes. DB 
participants confront competing regulatory and economic incentives. They face 
a very long time lag between errors occurring and their effects being felt. There 
is a similar long time lag between any changes to scheme strategy being made 
and the impact being observed. DB scheme “customers” – the members – are 
disengaged and have little influence over the “product” they have “purchased”, not 
least because they have little real understanding of that “product”. 
Contrast all this with the airline and health sectors: both have very engaged 
customers who know very quickly when errors have occurred, often with fatal 
effects. Other contrasts appear where Black Box Thinking calls for making 
incremental changes that lead to marginal improvements in the product or service 
offered. Classic examples of this are the thousands of small improvements in the 
design of Formula 1 cars and the 5,127 prototypes that James Dyson needed 
to build before he could launch his first vacuum cleaner. Are the same sort of 
incremental changes even possible in DB?
But this perhaps misses the point of Black Box Thinking – which is that it is the 
mindset of the participants towards failure which leads to improvement. This 
mindset encourages participants to constantly challenge the status quo – even if 
this includes apparently successful business practices – and to experiment with 
minor changes. So the question we’re actually interested in asking is whether the 
mindset of the DB occupational pension sector is more like that of commercial 
aviation or healthcare.
In view of this, we apply Black Box Thinking to the strategy setting process of the 
trustee boards in DB occupational pension schemes. The paper seeks to find out 
the degree to which DB pensions schemes are open loop – able and willing to 
learn from their mistakes – or closed loop – unable or unwilling to learn from their 
mistakes because they don’t measure errors, have a culture where errors are not 
recognised or are unable to turn errors into learning that feeds back to improve the 
system. In the past, trustees have tended to rely heavily on top-down diktats from 
The Pensions Regulator. We’re looking for ways boards can improve bottom-up 
decision making, not to indict the trustees or any other actors in the sector. 
The findings in this paper are based on interviews with eight experts who are 
pension scheme CEOs, senior trustees, senior policy advisers, actuaries and 
industry association leads. We’ve agreed not to name the experts as they hold 
senior positions in the sector and could be identified by the views they offered, so 
anonymity allows them to be more candid. The paper is organised into three parts:
1. What mistakes are being made by DB trustee boards today? What are the 
errors that emerge in strategy setting that Black Box Thinking can be applied to?
2. How do boards evaluate errors? Do boards have a culture of recognising and 
measuring errors and are they able to learn from their mistakes to improve future 
decision making?
3. Ways to improve. Based on our analysis, what can schemes do to individually 
improve their decision-making and become open loop thinkers? 
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What mistakes are being made by trustee boards today? 
The first step in our analysis was to ask interviewees whether boards were 
currently making appropriate strategic decisions. We asked what information 
could be used to identify errors when they occur in DB pension schemes and to 
show if there were underlying issues or mistakes with board strategy setting. 
We prompted interviewees to identify failings according to their own definitions 
of “mistake” and this led to considerable debate which we summarise as the 
distinction between the “content of decisions” and the “process of decision 
making”. The need for the interviewees to define “mistake” is in itself an 
indication that there is no common industry-wide approach, unlike the civil 
aviation industry – where it is pretty clear when a mistake has been made.
All agreed that the content of trustee decision-making is inevitably error prone. 
Trustees are making strategic decisions in the face of uncertainty relating to 
issues such as investment performance, the strength of the sponsor covenant and 
member circumstances. Furthermore, the classification of the outcome of these 
decisions as a mistake or not also depends on who is viewing the decision, for 
example, the board or the regulator.
As these kind of “mistakes” are an unavoidable part of the job, it is the 
“process of decision making” that is our main interest. Trustees must make 
strategic decisions under uncertainty, so they need a framework to support 
their decisions. 
All interviewees also agreed that the strength of the sponsor covenant is the 
main indicator of the health of a pension scheme in deficit, and something 
which interviewees say should be used in decision making. But a weak sponsor 
covenant is not evidence of failure in trustee decision making per se. Indeed, 
several trustees told us that the industry needed a common standard to measure 
sponsor risk.
All this is the territory of Black Box Thinking which looks at ways to get better 
outcomes by measuring results, applying feedback loops and establishing 
processes to combat human biases.
What quantitative measures reveal errors in decision making?
Are there quantitative measures that will show up errors when they occur 
in DB scheme strategy setting? One trustee responded, “There’s a lack of 
measurement – I’m not sure we have the data to make an informed judgement”.
A common response was that interviewees felt trustees were doing a good 
job, but had been dealt a very difficult hand with the current regulatory and 
economic environment and, given this, it was difficult to tell the sector’s story 
in numbers. Nevertheless, most believed there were wide differences in the 
performance of schemes that could be addressed by improving the effectiveness 
of boards themselves. “The DB landscape is very varied… some good schemes, 
some less good,” one trustee said. 
Several interviewees pointed to the huge sponsor contributions into schemes 
over the past decade, but without any noticeable effect on the size of fund 
deficits, as evidence of a mistake where decision making could be improved: 
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“The sector’s outlook has worsened if you take into account the money that’s 
gone in”, was one example.
Current deficits were frequently described as a consequence of poor decision 
making about interest-rates. “I don’t think strategies have generally been that bad 
except for the failure to hedge interest rates. This has had huge consequences 
and impacted on everything. Boards made a mistake on interest-rate hedging, 
some have learned from that, some are waiting for interest rates to rise, the rest 
are making interest rate bets and don’t want to acknowledge the issue.”
Notwithstanding this, all interviewees felt that decision making had improved in 
the past decade. Several said new regulations had improved the performance 
of boards including The Pension Regulator’s work on fees and costs and the 
promotion of integrated risk management. Low interest rates; sinking levels of 
solvency; the increasing maturity of schemes; the option of buyout; and the 
shock of BHS had also helped trustees “up their game”. 
“It used to be that the end game was so far away, it could almost be ignored. 
But now we have to plan to be bought out on a gilts plus basis in just five years, 
it tends to concentrate the mind,” one trustee said. Another noted: “Trustees 
are much more aware than three, four or five years ago. Seeing trustees and 
advisers in front of Frank Field’s parliamentary committee caused a number of 
trustees to resign, they weren’t aware of their responsibilities and thought, ‘there 
but for the grace of God go I’”. A third said “Trustees are less comfortable than 
a few years ago about going along with what they are advised to do; they’re 
questioning more and are less certain about things presented as ‘facts’”.
Applying Black Box Thinking
In Black Box Thinking, comparison of “error rates” between entities such as 
airlines and hospitals helps drive improvements. 
With the exception of quantitative information on fund deficits, our experts 
said there were no yardsticks that could be used to measure mistakes in 
DB pension schemes in the same way that mortality is used in healthcare 
or aviation. In other words, the pensions industry is characterised by 
a lack of measurement and hence an absence of the data to make an 
informed judgement.
A striking illustration of a mistake is the huge sponsor contributions into 
schemes over the past decade, without any noticeable effect on the size 
of fund deficits. This is now recognised as a consequence of poor decision 
making about interest-rates and the failure to hedge interest rates.
While decision making has improved in the past decade, this is mainly 
for top-down reasons, such as new regulations on fees and costs and the 
promotion by the regulator of integrated risk management. 
What sort of mistakes are trustee boards making that lessons could 
be learned from?
Black Box Thinking looks at the process of decision making rather than the 
content of decisions in order to get better outcomes by measuring results, 
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applying feedback loops and establishing processes to combat human biases. 
One trustee summarised the mistakes they believed trustees needed help with in 
just these terms: “Like all people, as trustees, we unintentionally tend to focus on 
the parts of the job we find easier to understand, and believe we can influence, 
and less on the things we don’t.”
This is an example of cognitive bias, and biases like these proved to be typical 
drivers leading to the mistakes interviewees described as most frequently occurring 
in board strategy setting. Most interviewees thought that trustees spent too much 
time focusing on investment performance and not enough attention on sponsor 
funding. For instance, trustees “look in microscopic detail on how a fund has 
performed over the past 12 months”, but they were far less likely to challenge a 
sponsor on their recovery plan or dividend policy when a fund was in deficit. 
One trustee said that the separation of investment and funding into different 
board subcommittees exacerbated this problem, leading to a disconnect and an 
“investment strategy at odds with the long-term funding target”. 
Sometimes trustees would take sponsor funding levels as a given and not something 
which could be challenged, leading them to take a narrow view of what was in 
members’ best interests. As one trustee put it: “You have to be very hard-nosed and 
confident in your expertise to challenge company sponsors. Every single pension 
scheme I’ve worked at has said it has a strong covenant, but in reality some are 
weak and some are strong.” 
Biases among sponsor-appointed trustees could lead to mistakes in investment 
decisions. Trustees and policy experts saw instances of finance director trustees 
encouraging investment decisions that improved short-term, mark-to-market 
company balance sheet valuations of schemes to the detriment of long-term 
performance, leading to a worse outcome for the sponsor. One trustee suggested 
the problem was approaching mark-to-market as a binary decision: “Mark-to-
market has failed because of conflict in the way these judgments are made, the 
mistake is a standard rationality that sticks rigidly to either end of a continuum, 
instead of being prepared to ask more difficult questions that look at the intervening 
positions and triangulate different valuation methods.”6
Another trustee noted: “Mostly it has been finance directors that have pushed back 
on increasing hedging because they lose some chance of upside and feel yields 
on government bonds [which influence the the discount rate on liabilities] have to 
increase. There’s something emotional going on, a lack of desire to lock in. Where 
there is a fiduciary mandate, hedging has been much higher, why is that?”
The last two paragraphs reflect the career concerns of the finance directors who 
need to show that the company is doing well on their watch, even if this involves 
passing the buck to future finance directors. A similar issue was seen with the role 
of advisers, where partly the issue was boards failing to recognise or address the 
biases of advisers. Interviewees described an “overreliance on advisors to support 
decision making because board capability doesn’t exist” and said boards were too 
reluctant to question advice, even though trustees recognise that advisory business 
models, or even advice given by executives from the sponsoring company (such as 
finance directors), can reflect different priorities from those of the scheme.
6  With mark-to-market, both assets and liabilities are valued on a market-consistent basis. 
This contrasts with valuation methods that allow some smoothing of assets and liabilities, as 
happens when "matching adjustments" are permitted (e.g., under Solvency II).
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“Advisors are incentivised to float advice on the same basis to different boards 
because it is in their commercial interest and provides them with a safety net: 
they won’t take the risk of going outside house models because, if challenged 
by the regulator, they want something to fall back on,” an actuary noted. “One 
scheme we recently took on actually had a buyout surplus that it wasn’t aware 
of. The board didn’t take action because of poor advice, possibly because the 
consulting actuary didn’t want to lose the client,” a professional trustee said.
Trustees reported that they could also be drawn into executive decision-making 
or resolving operating issues. Resolving disputes over benefit payments or 
implementing risk management systems were cited as examples. In small 
schemes, this was sometimes due to lack of executive support. Interviewees 
said this could draw trustees into domains beyond their expertise or became 
a distraction from implementing the scheme strategy. Trustees might become 
responsible for implementing adviser recommendations, when ideally this 
should have been an executive task handled by a project manager. “Advisers 
say ‘here’s an issue’, but do not normally explain how to resolve it,’ another 
trustee noted. “Boards don’t know how to deal with the issue and turn into a 
project where they can measure the results. There is a mismatch between the 
board’s subject matter expertise and the need for project planning capability.’
Applying Black Box Thinking
In decision making, Black Box Thinking suggests mistakes occur when 
processes that mitigate cognitive bias are absent. The mistakes interviewees 
identified seem to fall into this category and they are mainly related to 
governance: 
(1)  Focusing on what trustees know and failing to focus on areas where 
trustees had little expertise or understanding.
(2)  The separation of investment and funding decisions, and the failure to 
challenge the sponsor’s recovery plan or dividend policy.
(3)  A short-termist attitude, especially by sponsor-appointed trustees, e.g., in 
respect of investment performance and hedging strategies.
(4)  Failing to recognise biases in others, such as the career concerns of 
finance directors who need to show that the company is doing well on 
their watch, or of advisers who temper their advice to clients to avoid 
losing the contract.
(5)  Being distracted from their main focus, e.g., by being drawn into making 
decisions that are really outside their remit, such as resolving disputes over 
benefit payment or implementing adviser recommendations, when this 
should be an executive task handled by a project manager.
In the next section, we examine whether boards have a culture of recognising 
and measuring the kind of mistakes identified above and are able to learn from 
their mistakes to improve future decision making at the margin. 
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How are mistakes evaluated and learned from? 
In Black Box Thinking, it is not the mistakes themselves that are the issue, it is 
how they are identified, analysed and acted upon. Measuring results, having 
a culture that allows introspection about mistakes, applying feedback loops 
and establishing processes to combat human biases leads to better outcomes. 
So how well are trustee boards doing?
Measuring results: Do boards make measurements that will signal 
mistakes?
Interviewees said there were pockets of excellence where boards set 
measureable objectives and targets which enabled outcomes to be evaluated 
and mistakes identified, but it appears that these were not widespread and 
more a product of a fortunate set of circumstances (which we discuss later 
in this paper). Instead of being a discussion about which metrics to use, 
interviewees wanted to talk more about the presence or absence of goals and 
about measurement as a whole.
“As schemes close and mature, many become clearer about goals, such as 
buyout by a particular date or self-sufficiency over a certain period of time. 
Most have a pro-forma flight path,” said one trustee. Another noted, “In many 
schemes, long-term strategy is vaguely defined and depends on good fortune to 
get there, there aren’t any agreed hard-edged plans. If markets are like the tide, 
they’re hoping that the tide will bring them in.” 
A third said, “It varies from scheme to scheme and is generally improving. But 
even where the actual goal is fairly clear, the timescale by necessity is fairly 
flexible, so it is easy to push it out to the right.” 
Although all schemes viewed changes in the size of the deficit as a red 
flag that should be a call for action, interviewees said there were few other 
commonly agreed metrics that boards could monitor that would help to detect 
mistakes being made. 
“There is a lack of transparency, and risk isn’t really being measured,” said 
one actuary. “It’s hard to do and not done very well… It leads boards to the 
conclusion that they can’t tolerate risks, but de-risking will require the employer 
to put in more money, so they can’t afford to de-risk either”.
Some boards had agreed a narrow and clearly defined set of indicators they 
would monitor, but this was not universal practice. Other boards, interviewees 
suggested, had so much information potentially available they had trouble 
identifying signals from noise. Some boards were unclear about the values the 
metrics had to indicate before it became clear that there was a problem that 
needed addressing and several interviewees thought guidelines would help 
some boards decide if they were “in the red zone”.
A lack of benchmarks and indicators sometimes led to poor spending decisions, 
particularly on consultants fees. One trustee said. “I saw an example where the 
board was advised to do something involving £100m of expenses, it was quite 
complex, needed the company and advisers to be as one. I asked how many 
members it involved, the response was 12. It would be cheaper to pay these 
dozen members £1m each and save £88m than go through the exercise”.
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One trustee encouraged boards to ask advisers to set measureable targets for each 
piece of analysis produced for the board. “A new person from the in-house team 
did an analysis of the risk characteristics of the portfolio as it exists today. It failed 
the ‘so what’ test and we asked for targets so we could look again in 12 months to 
see if the portfolio was better balanced. It’s a scientific approach and we should set 
out experiments like this and test them. But this process is often absent.”
Applying Black Box Thinking 
Interviewees suggest that schemes do not systematically measure mistakes, 
although there are individual examples of best practice. Issues raised 
include:
(1)  An absence of clear goals and instead a vaguely defined long-term 
strategy which cascades down into poor measurement of errors in 
decision making.
(2)  Even in schemes with clearer goals, the timescale is often so flexible 
that the problem can be repeatedly kicked down the road.
(3)  While all boards paid attention when the size of the deficit changed, 
there were few other commonly agreed metrics that boards could 
monitor that would help to detect mistakes being made.
(4)  In the absence of a narrow and clearly defined set of indicators, there 
was the danger that trustees had so much information potentially 
available they had trouble identifying signals from noise.
(5)  There were two issues in particular that emerged as a result of a lack 
of benchmarks and indicators: risk not being measured and poor 
spending decisions, particularly on consultants fees.
Black Box Thinking made similar findings for the healthcare system. For 
example, medical professionals also set the goal-posts in a way that meant 
errors weren’t revealed.
Culture of introspection: What is the attitude towards raising mistakes?
Trustees felt that many schemes had a culture where it was possible to report 
mistakes without fear of censure. They also felt they could speak up when they 
saw something troubling, one trustee highlighting the “any other business” 
agenda item as means of raising such issues. However, trustees felt that 
frequently there were ingrained cultural reasons why mistakes might not come 
to light or be dealt with.
No ownership of mistakes
Interviewees said they commonly encountered trustee boards that did not feel 
that they “owned” or were responsible for mistakes. One told us: “Boards are 
not willing to admit mistakes because it would show they are responsible. The 
result is that it isn’t reported. There isn’t much of a culture of going back and 
analysing past decision making.” Another said: “As trustees, we need to play 
the devil’s advocate, but people aren’t able to predict markets, so when deficits 
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have deteriorated on their watch, I’m not sure that trustees hold themselves 
accountable for previous decisions, since they don’t look back to see whether 
the decision made sense.”
“The big issue is not an unwillingness to learn from mistakes, but a general 
tendency not to take responsibility at all. Everyone seems to say ‘there we 
are, never mind’, pretty much brushing it straight under the carpet. People do 
shift strategies with the benefit of hindsight, but I don’t think there’s a general 
tendency to say ‘hang on, should we really have done this?’ So board members 
are not worried about mistakes, because they’re not accountable: there’s a lack 
of clarity about whose mistake it is. Where hedging hasn’t happened, I don’t 
think people looked for who is responsible, because it was a joint decision, 
and there has not been that much analysis as to it having been a mistake.” 
Another expert pointed to cases where mistakes were not even recognised 
as such: “We discussed implementing liability-driven investing (LDI) three 
years ago and actually implemented it one year ago. There was a lot of self-
congratulation because we saved £1m, but if we’d done it earlier we would 
have saved multiple millions.”
Executives not pointing out mistakes
The experience of executives bringing mistakes to the attention of the boards 
varied. Some executives “were keen to recast mistakes in a good light, so that 
the board didn’t feel they had made a bad decision”. One interviewee pointed 
out that very few schemes offered “incentives” or rewarded executives for being 
forthcoming about mistakes. 
Inertia and herding
One interviewee pointed to a culture of inertia in dealing with mistakes: “The 
consequences of decisions to do nothing and take no action – like not hedging 
liabilities – aren’t as carefully monitored or managed as decisions to take 
action.” Another noted: “The general theme for trustees as a whole is inertia, 
not taking a decision. It’s the most powerful force of all. The ‘stop loss’ mindset 
doesn’t exist among trustees. Traders set stop losses and when they reach them 
they must cut losses, they don’t double up. It’s a hard discipline, but it would be 
a beneficial way for trustees to think about exposures.” 
So there is a strong bias against taking action and this is reinforced if the 
action is new and unconventional, such as introducing LDI. One expert told 
us that there were plenty of boards “jam packed with experts”, but LDI was 
not implemented because it was not “conventional wisdom”. Of course, once 
something does become “conventional wisdom”, everyone tends to jump in, 
whether it is the right thing to do or not.7 A recent survey of trustees found 
that: “Some 60% of respondents expect to seriously consider liability-driven 
investment for their scheme, with 41% considering income-focused strategies 
as a potential solution for their cash flow dilemma”. So herding behaviour 
(not wanting to be different from the rest of the crowd) is another powerful 
behavioural bias that needs to be recognised and overcome. 
7  Newton Investment Management and Pensions Insight (2107), Independent Trustees Research 
Report 2017
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Blaming others
“I see trustees being more critical of advisers and investment managers than 
themselves, it’s a natural human characteristic,” a trustee told us.
Another expert summed it up as follows: “As humans, we need to accept that 
we’re not always rational. Although we should take emotion out and make 
decisions more rational, that’s close to impossible. All decisions are emotional, 
so we need to accept that they are and work around that.”
These reactions are consistent with what psychologists call “cognitive 
dissonance”. This features prominently in Black Box Thinking, as Matthew Syed 
explains (p. 81): “[It] describes the inner tension we feel when…our beliefs are 
challenged by evidence. Most of us like to think of ourselves as rational and 
smart. We reckon we are pretty good at reaching sound judgements. …That is 
why when we mess up, …our self-esteem is threatened. ...In these circumstances 
we have two choices. The first is to accept that our original judgements may 
have been at fault. …The difficulty with this option is simple: it is threatening. 
It requires us to accept that we are not as smart as we like to think. …So here’s 
the second option: denial. We reframe the evidence. We filter it, we spin it, or 
ignore it altogether.” And then we go on to blame others. 
But this is classic closed loop thinking and can have very negative consequences 
as Syed points out elsewhere in his book: “It is when a culture has an unhealthy 
attitude to mistakes, that blame is common, cover-ups are normal, and people 
fear to take sensible risks” (p. 81). “This is why blame should not be apportioned 
for reasons of corporate or political expediency, but only after a proper 
investigation by experts with a ground-level understanding of the complexity 
in which professionals operate” (p.263). Otherwise, there is a weakening of 
“forward looking accountability”, the accountability to “learn from adverse 
events” and so reduce the risk of future avoidable mistakes (p.245).
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Applying Black Box Thinking
Again like the findings of Black Box Thinking for the medical profession, 
interviewees suggest that many boards do not have a culture of seeking 
out and revealing mistakes – consistent with a closed loop mindset. 
Examples raised include:
(1)  No ownership of mistakes. The most frequently reported illustration 
of this was an increase in the scheme deficit being blamed on 
unforeseeably low interest rates rather than seeing this, with the benefit 
of introspection and hindsight, as an error in decision making about 
hedging interest rates. 
(2)  Executives not pointing out mistakes. The lack of ownership of mistakes 
is reinforced in schemes that have a culture where the executive tries 
to massage the ego of the trustees, so they do not feel that they made 
a bad decision.
(3)  Inertia and herding. Inertia is the most powerful force of all: there is 
a strong behavioural bias against taking action, particularly if the 
action is new, such as liability-driven investing. Herding, as in the rush 
to adopt LDI once it has become “conventional wisdom”, is another 
powerful behavioural bias that needs to be recognised and overcome.
(4)  Blaming others is classic closed loop thinking consistent with cognitive 
dissonance – where our minds are in a state of denial about a mistake 
and so we reframe the evidence and look elsewhere for scapegoats.
 
Black Box Thinking suggests that trustees feeling they will not face fear of censure 
for reporting mistakes is right, but only if there is accountability for outcomes; 
currently, trustees do not declare themselves accountable for financial outcomes 
and this may be why they do not feel any ownership of mistakes. So no lessons 
are learned. Just as damaging is the situation where mistakes are covered up 
and then, if they are exposed, there is an attempt to immediately allocate blame. 
But blame should not be apportioned for reasons of corporate or political 
expediency, only after a proper investigation by experts. Otherwise, there is a 
weakening of forward looking accountability and people will be afraid to take 
sensible risks that are in the long-term financial interests of the scheme.
Feedback and processes to combat human biases: Are boards able 
to learn from mistakes?
“Good decision-making starts at the top with appointments to the trustee 
board and advisers. My thesis is that if you get the right people appointed 
for their experience, knowledge and intelligence they will then make sure 
they have resources to do the job or introduce cost-saving measures, such as 
administrative pooling arrangements and consolidation,” one trustee said.
This quote explains why interviewees report a wide divergence in the ability of 
boards to learn from past mistakes because it depends on a particular scheme’s 
good fortune in forming the right constellation of board members and advisers. 
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Some schemes systematically attempt to identify and evaluate mistakes, similar 
to a post-mortem, following many of the best practices outlined in Black Box 
Thinking. For example, two of our trustee interviewees reported that “At each 
board meeting, we routinely ask each member one thing we could do better” 
and “On many boards, where things go wrong, there are quite formalised 
lessons-learnt processes.” 
Another good example was the use of decision pre-mortems which also feature 
prominently in Black Box Thinking as mechanisms for avoiding future mistakes.8 
Interviewees said these varied widely in usage. “On big ticket items, we do, 
and bigger schemes tend to do them as standard.” External events could trigger 
pre-mortems: “People are naturally risk averse, so pre-mortems work well when 
there’s a new investment idea, a move in LDI, or a forthcoming valuation or 
enhanced transfer value exercise. A one pager on a change in valuation that 
can be shared with the sponsor can be a useful basis for a valuation discussion 
at the next board meeting.” Value-at-risk exercises were regarded as useful pre-
mortems “if we also have the narrative around them and are not just presented 
with a range of different scenarios with no further explanation”. Others 
suggested boards needed to go further with their pre-mortem exercises and ask 
“What if in five years’ time, we entered the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) as the 
result of this decision, so what went wrong?” 
Where boards were not working effectively, this was often due to governance 
problems arising from classic principal-agent gamesmanship: “Some of the 
worst outcomes come about because of poor communications between parties 
– trustee and sponsor – with both sides holding on to information to protect 
their power. I’ve seen trustees who don’t want the sponsor to see the investment 
strategy as they fear the sponsor will unduly try to influence it: it becomes a 
power play.” Then there are the schemes that don’t even attempt to identify 
mistakes for a variety of reasons, including the skills of the boards, sponsor 
domination of boards, a particular board chair, poor advice, poor resourcing 
and low exposure to the workings of peer schemes. 
“It depends on the bunch of people you have around the table to pull things 
together. It’s often down to the quality of the chair. I’ve seen the outsourced 
provider model work well, but it’s a delicate model. It can appear to be 
working, you have the right people, the right secretariat – and then whole thing 
crumbles. Open the trap door and in five years it’s a mess,” one trustee said.
Said another: “Scheme governance is a cocktail for a system not designed 
to find ‘truth’. There are many trustee boards that don’t have the capability, 
expertise, resources and time to look at issues from a different perspective, 
and don’t have the capability to challenge advisers outside the framework.”
And “Governance in many schemes is constrained because too little time is 
spent on strategic thinking. There is scope in many schemes to improve strategic 
support and make it more full time, something that is looked at quarterly, rather 
than annually,” one trustee said. 
8  In a pre-mortem, a team is invited to consider plausible reasons why a plan has gone wrong 
(not why it might go wrong) even before it has been put into practice. It is also known as 
“prospective hindsight” and can increase the ability to identify reasons for future outcomes by 
up to 30% according to supporters of the concept.
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There are boards which are “lurching from valuation to valuation, it becomes 
a bit of a treadmill. With constraints on time and resources, personnel turnover, 
they don’t have the ability or luxury to say, ‘Let’s try a different way, or let’s 
work through couple of routes to this’. Many are crossing their fingers that they 
will get through the next valuation cycle.”
Applying Black Box Thinking
Black Box analysis reveals examples of good schemes which learn from 
mistakes, but like the medical profession this is localised rather than 
industry wide as seen in aviation. 
Examples of good practice include:
(1) Routinely asking each board member one thing we could do better.
(2) Using post-mortems with lessons learned where things go wrong.
(3)  Using pre-mortems as mechanisms for avoiding future mistakes, such 
as considering a new investment idea, a move in LDI, or a forthcoming 
valuation or enhanced transfer value exercise.
Examples of poor practice include:
(1)  Principal-agent gamesmanship between the trustee and sponsor – with 
both sides holding on to information to protect their power, e.g, trustees 
who don’t want the sponsor to see the investment strategy as they fear 
the sponsor will unduly try to influence it.
(2)  Failing even to attempt to identify mistakes for a variety of reasons, 
including the skills of the boards, sponsor domination of boards, a 
particular board chair, poor advice, poor resourcing and low exposure 
to the workings of peer schemes. 
(3)  Boards spending too little time on strategic thinking, and instead 
lurching from one short term problem to another. 
Even though some schemes have an open loop mindset, lessons from mistakes 
in one scheme are not transferred in a systematic way to other schemes. The 
sector as a whole is a closed loop. 
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Ways to improve 
Can schemes use Black Box Thinking to improve strategic decision making? 
Although some of the framework’s prescriptions – such as making frequent 
small incremental changes to drive innovation – are problematic for DB pension 
schemes,9 the core idea that change can be “bottom-up” has a certain currency 
among our interviewees. At the same time, several interviewees saw the need 
for a “top down” organisation to enable information sharing between trustees. 
Black Box Thinking argues that the constellation of board members and advisers 
in the better governed schemes should be studied for their lessons, rather than 
being viewed as the result of good fortune which can’t be replicated. 
Why more bottom-up change is needed
Interviewees largely agreed that the sector tended to rely on top-down change 
driven by the regulator, but that schemes could also decide to act – both 
individually and collectively – to make changes from the bottom up.
As one trustee said: “Those of us at the coal face have lots of authority and 
influence to do things better, yet I don’t think we can wait for politicians to make 
new laws and for regulators to act. Someone said ‘trustees can’t challenge 
investment advice’ – but the truth is that we can challenge all advice. Trustees 
decide what to do, trustees have enormous power and scope to make changes 
– if only they recognised this better.”
A policy expert noted that, although regulation could support Black Box 
Thinking and had already been used to make nudges aimed at helping 
boards identify and learn from mistakes, it was too blunt an instrument to help 
individual schemes. “As a policy person, I can see we’re demanding an awful 
lot, and people can struggle to rise to the challenge. Trustees rightly should be 
looking outside to find support and guidance for their decision making, but if 
they’re looking to the civil servants at the regulator, then they’re in trouble.” 
This is because, the policy expert noted, the regulator was anticipating the 
failure of some schemes and their entry into the PPF. A recent report from the 
Pensions Institute predicted that up to 1,000 schemes were at risk.10 These 
schemes have weak sponsors that are likely to become insolvent over the 
next 10 years and end up in the PPF. However, it is estimated that 400 of 
these schemes could be saved if they take decisive action. Black Box Thinking 
provides a potentially useful framework for doing this.
9  In contrast with the world of Formula 1 cars and Dyson vacuum cleaners, marginal or 
incremental changes are neither common nor generally feasible in the pensions world, given 
that it takes up to 70 years for any change to fully work its way through the system. However, 
a recent example is auto-enrolment introduced in October 2012. Individuals are automatically 
enrolled into an authorised pension scheme whenever they start a job. Prior to 6 April 2018, 
the employee and employer contribution rates are 2% and 1% p.a., respectively. However, 
these rates will be automatically increased to 3% and 2% p.a., respectively, on 6 April 2018, 
and to 5% and 3% p.a., respectively, on 6 April 2019. Another example is the gradual increase 
in the state pension age for women from 60 to 65 between 2010 and 2018.
10  Greatest Good for the Greatest Number: An examination of early intervention strategies for 
trustees and sponsoring employers of stressed defined benefit schemes released in December 
2015. http://www.pensions-institute.org/reports/GreatestGood.pdf
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Reflections on ways to open the loop
Our research suggests that some schemes have a constellation of board members 
and advisers who between them have an “open loop” attitude and are able to 
identify and learn from mistakes. How can other schemes follow their example?
One trustee neatly summarised two ways: “There’s the kind of best practice you 
pay expensive consultants for, namely, process-type advice and those processes 
do help. For example, the focus on integrated risk management. But the danger 
is that it becomes too much about process and just another excuse for 
consultants to charge money.”
“The other type involves individual trustees developing their relationships, 
networks and communications channels. Having professional trustees helps, 
having access to information helps. How you arrange that I’m not sure.” 
Black Box Thinking provides a framework for building on the second type of 
approach. It encourages trustees to acquire and share best practices themselves, 
from the bottom-up, while recognising the need for a top-down body like The 
Pensions Regulator to collect and share information about mistakes. 
Interviewees suggested several avenues that boards could use to get access 
to best practice:
Regular appointment of new board members and advisers
“New blood” was cited as the most powerful catalyst for change and learning 
to do things differently by several interviewees: “The most dramatic change 
in learning I see is putting in new professional trustees, particularly where 
the board’s problem is the relative dynamic between trustees and sponsors. 
Sometimes the existing professional trustee relationship is just not working.” 
Also, “In the absence of new people, it’s common for boards to get stuck in a 
rut. Often a review of strategy is prompted by a change in the board, the chair, 
the composition of the investment committee, key advisers or the arrival of a 
new director of pensions on the corporate side.”
Several interviewees suggested schemes could look to the corporate governance 
code for the boards of public listed companies overseen by the Financial Reporting 
Council for ideas on best practice. Corporate board members, for instance, are far 
more accountable for financial outcomes than trustees of pension schemes.11 
Improving diversity 
Interviewees thought improving the diversity of boards and their advisers would 
help by both exposing boards to new ideas and reducing the risk of groupthink 
in decision making. “It’s improving. There’s momentum and recognition of the 
issue, but there’s still not a lot of diversity on boards at the moment,” said one 
trustee. Said another, “When I go to pensions conferences, it’s 95% 65-year-old 
middle class men, the same type of people making the same decisions, we need 
a spread in age, gender and ethnic background.” Although not the most obvious 
11  Proposed new rules state that the chairs of company boards should step down after nine years, 
including time spent in previous non-executive director roles (Madison Marriage “UK corporate 
governance code changes to hit dozens of chairmen,” Financial Times, 11 December 2017)
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example of diversity, several trustees said one benefit of member trustees was that 
they were not experts and they asked “naïve” questions in board meetings that 
were actually challenging for advisers and board chairs to answer.
Sympathetic advisers
One trustee suggested that boards should look for advisers “who bring best practice/
expertise in and share their experiences” as opposed to those who “never contribute 
anything beyond their immediate advice”. Boards should “ask their actuarial and 
investment advisers to list on one page what other clients are doing to increase 
awareness and so they can discuss why these ideas might work for their scheme.”
Conferences and forums
Interviewees noted that large schemes had access to international conferences 
and networks to share practices, but these were normally organised by advisers 
and trustees felt it difficult to speak openly at them. One said “mistakes are 
never discussed, we’re always banging on about what we’re doing right.”
Several interviewees suggested that the trustees didn’t have a place to turn to 
where they could share “war stories” or learn from the mistakes of others and 
it would be desirable if there were a neutral forum in which they could do this. 
Interviewees would also like to collectively discuss key performance indicators 
that would help boards monitor their performance and make detailed 
comparisons of fund investment allocations, the corporate debt spreads of their 
sponsors and differences in scheme risk profiles. 
Some interviewees would likely to develop common key performance indicators 
that boards would voluntarily share with the regulator and members: “Nothing 
dramatically original – just sending a report to members and regulators will 
force boards’ attention on the issues. Members are very rarely told when things 
are on target or off target. There might be commentary on dramatic market 
movements, but it’s not quantified.”
As no universal forum exists at present, several interviewees suggested the 
regulator could play a role. However, nothing is preventing trustees banding 
together to set up a body of their own. A forum exists for member nominated 
trustees – The Association of Member Nominated Trustees – which describes 
its conferences as a place that “trustees can let their hair down”.
Away days
“Most schemes have an annual training day…it’s either the highlight or the lowlight 
of the trustee year. Some schemes have self-imposed rules on who presents. You’re 
not allowed to hear from existing advisers in order to get fresh thinking – someone 
externally from a large scheme, not a consultant. All talk is under Chatham House 
rules. I’ve done it a few times, it can be very interesting. Even if it results in no 
change at all to the existing framework, you have the reassurance that not doing 
something was the right decision, since others had looked into it already.”
Administrative pooling arrangements and consolidation
Several interviewees pointed out that administrative pooling arrangements and 
consolidation could bring new best practice to schemes. As noted by one trustee, 
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“We work with several hundred schemes and have pooled support for a number 
which lets us share our experience widely.”
A central clearing house for post-mortems of scheme failures
All interviewees thought it would be useful if trustees could learn from the mistakes and 
best practices of other schemes. Several called for a clearing house of information. 
While it would be possible for a member association or other organisation to 
provide this role, it is likely that only The Pensions Regulator would have sufficient 
access to information to provide post-mortems of failed schemes. This role would 
dovetail well with the regulator’s remit to “improve the way that workplace pension 
schemes are run” and existing work on improving scheme governance standards.
“It would be interesting to have access to case studies to look at what went wrong 
in schemes and five actions that might have helped. It would be interesting to 
know what metrics might have helped boards make better analysis in hindsight.”
Applying Black Box Thinking
Our interviewees indicate that there are schemes that have an open loop 
mindset and are able to identify and learn from mistakes. But for many, 
perhaps the majority of schemes, the loop functions incompletely and, for 
some, it is closed entirely. It is a big step to turn the Black Box Thinking 
philosophy into action that shapes the day-to-day activities of trustees.
Black Box Thinking suggests that information sharing is an effective means 
of addressing this problem: opening up routes that trustees can acquire and 
share best practices themselves. There are a number of different ways of 
achieving this from the bottom up: 
(1)  “New blood” board members and advisers appointed on a regular basis.
(2)  Improving diversity – one benefit of member trustees was that were not 
experts and they asked “naïve” questions in board meetings that were 
actually challenging for advisers and board chairs to answer.
(3) Sympathetic advisers sharing best practice experience.
(4)  Conferences and forums, although since these were normally organised 
by advisers and trustees felt it difficult to speak openly at them: “mistakes 
are never discussed, we’re always banging on about what we’re doing 
right”. They could also be used to discuss key performance indicators 
that would help boards monitor their performance and make detailed 
comparisons of fund investment allocations.
(5)  Away days with presentations from other larger schemes, but not from 
existing advisers.
(6)  Administrative pooling arrangements and consolidation. As noted by 
one trustee, “We work with several hundred schemes and have pooled 
support for a number which lets us share our experience widely.”
From the top down, there is a role for the regulator to play as a clearing 
house for post-mortems of failed schemes.
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Conclusion 
Our research indicates that the DB pension industry is more like the healthcare 
industry than the civil aviation sector: a decentralised system that is not set 
up to help decision-makers admit mistakes nor to share them, making it more 
difficult to identify patterns that are common between schemes and prevent 
future errors. 
Better governed schemes have a constellation of board members and advisers 
in an “open loop” and are able to identify and learn from mistakes. But many 
schemes are in a “closed loop” without: measurement systems that record 
mistakes; a culture of discussing mistakes; nor mechanisms for learning or 
improving practices. Most schemes with a closed loop mindset are probably 
unaware that this is the case. That is likely to be the biggest challenge for the 
industry and indicates a role for the regulator to help share post-mortems of 
schemes via a central clearing house.
Good governance is known to have a significant impact on the performance 
of pension schemes and in a system administering £1.5 trillion in assets even 
minor improvements could lead to billions of pounds in improvements overall. 
Keith Ambachtsheer, director of the Rotman International Centre for Pension 
Management, has estimated that effectively governed schemes outperform 
poorly governed schemes by 1–2% annually.12 
The question therefore becomes what to do about it? One trustee answered 
this by saying “Well if I were you, I wouldn’t start from here”, pointing out 
that the best opportunity we had for building a better DB system, perhaps 
along the lines of the Dutch collective defined contribution system – which was 
favourably mentioned by many trustees – was probably 20 or 30 years ago 
before the barriers to radical change were raised so high.
Despite this, both Black Box Thinking and our interviewees themselves indicate 
that trustees do still have the power to make substantial changes to the system, 
improving the decision-making capabilities of boards, scheme-by-scheme from 
the bottom-up. What’s needed to help them in this view of the world are the 
means for boards to become exposed to best practices in decision making 
processes which can open the loop. As Matthew Syed argues: “[All] strong, 
resilient [systems] share an essential pattern: an adaptive [and cumulative] 
process driven by detection and response to failure” (pp. 138-9). So this is the 
place we should start from.
12  Keith Ambachtsheer (2007) The Pension Revolution, Wiley (‘How Much is Good Governance 
Worth’, Chapter 19) 
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Cardano and Lincoln Pensions, now a Cardano company, are excited to sponsor 
the Pensions Institute Report “Bringing Black Box Thinking to the Pensions 
Industry”. We believe a systematic approach to learning from mistakes will help 
the pensions industry deliver better and more secure financial outcomes for 
beneficiaries, sponsoring employers and society. 
We agree with the authors that we, as an industry, can learn from the civil 
aviation sector about how to analyse mistakes and share findings without pointing 
fingers or assigning blame. As many schemes become cashflow negative and 
uncertainty over sponsors’ ability to fund deficits increases, the industry cannot 
afford to repeat mistakes of the past.
As pension challenges become more urgent, all industry participants need to 
work together to better protect the beneficiaries we serve. This report highlights 
that there is a demand in our industry for a post-mortem analysis of schemes that 
have entered the lifeboat – the PPF. An objective analysis of the chain of events 
that led to schemes entering the lifeboat, and sharing the lessons learned, is a 
crucial step in better dealing with pension problems.
We encourage the industry to systematically adopt ‘Integrated Risk Management’ 
(IRM), which holistically considers investment, funding and covenant risks. As 
underwriters of all these risks, sponsors can use this framework to view their 
pension exposures in the context of the company’s overall risk budget, and 
report the position to company boards. Trustees can use this framework to better 
identify vulnerabilities before they turn into insurmountable problems. Importantly, 
sponsors and trustees will have to eschew “tick-box” approaches to IRM and 
move beyond rhetoric, turning the theory into practices deeply embedded in 
governance, decision-making and management information systems.
We are especially passionate about this topic. The Cardano Group’s mission is 
to help pension funds, their sponsors and the people they serve achieve their 
financial goals in a more resilient, realistic and responsible way. Our deep 
understanding of the causes and impact of risk enables us to deliver planned and 
controlled performance for our clients, irrespective of economic conditions. The 
certainty over outcomes we provide is of significant value for trustees, sponsoring 
employers and members.
In 2016, Lincoln Pensions, the sponsor covenant adviser, joined forces with 
Cardano, the risk and investment specialist, to offer clients innovative, tailored 
integrated risk management services, including fiduciary management and 
investment advice.
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About the Pensions Institute
The objectives of the Pensions Institute are:
• to undertake high quality research in all fields related to pensions.
•  to communicate the results of that research to the academic and practitioner 
communities.
•  to establish an international network of pensions researchers from a variety of 
disciplines.
•  to provide expert independent advice to the pensions industry and Government.
We take a fully multidisciplinary approach. For the first time, disciplines such 
as economics, finance, insurance and actuarial science through to accounting, 
corporate governance, law and regulation have been brought together in order 
to enhance strategic thinking, research and teaching in pensions. As the first and 
only UK academic research centre focused entirely on pensions, the Pensions 
Institute unites some of the world’s leading experts in these fields in order to offer 
an integrated approach to solving the complex problems that arise in this field. 
The Pensions Institute undertakes research in a wide range of fields, including:
Pension microeconomics
The economics of individual and corporate pension planning, long-term savings 
and retirement decisions.
Pension fund management and performance
The investment management and investment performance of occupational and 
personal pension schemes. 
Pension funding and valuations 
The actuarial and insurance issues related to pension schemes, including risk 
management, asset liability management, funding, scheme design, annuities 
and guarantees.
Pension law and regulation
The legal aspects of pension schemes and pension fund management. 
Pension accounting, taxation and administration
The operational aspects of running pension schemes.
Marketing
The practice and ethics of selling group and individual pension products.
Macroeconomics of pensions
The implications of aggregate pension savings and the impact of the size and 
maturity of pension funds on other sectors of the economy (e.g., corporate, public 
and international sectors).
Public policy
Public policy issues surrounding pension provision and other employee benefits. 
Research disseminated by the Pensions Institute may include views on policy but 
the Pensions Institute itself takes no institutional policy positions.
For more details, see: pensions-institute.org

